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Abstract 
The phenomenon of manipulation of the economy by the incumbent for electoral purpose is called 
Political Business Cycles (PBC). Using policy control economic instruments, such as fiscal and monetary 
instruments, governments may manipulate the economy to gain electoral advantage by producing growth 
and decreasing unemployment before elections.  
Earlier research on PBC in Albania found clear evidence of fiscal expansion before elections. In addition 
to increased income from taxes and borrowing, another source of financing the increased fiscal expansion 
in transition countries may be income from privatization, which is also the object of the analysis of this 
paper. In our analysis we apply standard econometric approach, used widely for research related to PBC. 
We test if income from privatization increases before elections.  
We find statistically significant increase of income from privatization before general (parliamentary) 
elections, which may lead us to conclude that one of the reasons may be to finance increased expenditures 
before elections. Another motivation, behind this behavior of the incumbent, may be rent – seeking. 
These results are of particular interest, as it is for the first time that income from privatization is analyzed 
in conjunction with PBC. 
Keywords: Albania, Political Business Cycle, Privatization  
JEL Classification: E32, O23, H61  
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Political Cycles in Income from Privatization 
The case of Albania 
 
DRINI IMAMI, ENDRIT LAMI AND HOLGER KÄCHELEIN 
 
1. Introduction 
Sometimes it is called “Election years economics”: The long run interest of incumbents are 
largely dominated by the view on the next election, hence, they start to cycle around the question 
how to be reelected as a wolf does with the pray. There is a common sense that the economic 
performance before elections, determines, to a large extent the likelihood of reelection for the 
incumbent, and the other way around (Tibbits, 1931). Hence, economic factors influence 
political factors but also the political factors may influence economic ones – governments may 
use all means they possess, including economic policy instruments, to enhance the chances of 
reelections. Therefore governments may engage in expansionary economic policies prior 
elections, increasing output thereby trying to decreasing unemployment, in order to please the 
voters, creating this way Political Business Cycles (PBC).  
Over the last decades, there has been plenty of research and publications on PBC, aiming for 
analyzing and explaining the use of fiscal and monetary instruments by the incumbent to 
stimulate economic performance before elections. The government may behave opportunistically 
and inefficiently prior to elections engaging in expansionary economic policies, to increase the 
output and decrease unemployment, in order to please the voters, however, creating Political 
Budget Cycles and maybe also Political Business Cycles. The PBC model of Nordhaus (1975) 
opened the way for many following empirical and theoretical studies and publications and 
remains a point of reference. While initially, the focus of PBC related empirical research was 
focused on Western Countries, over the last decade there is growing interest of research on PBC 
in developing and/or transition countries, whose institutions, economies and societies differ 
significantly from those of developed/western countries. As shown by Brender and Dazen (2005) 
and Shi and Svensson (2006), new democracies are particularly vulnerable for political budget 
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cycles. While Alt and Lassen (2006) show the relevance of transparency, Brender and Dazen 
(2005) also pronounce the lack of experience that voters have in new democracies regarding the 
existence of political fiscal cycles. Meanwhile, Shi and Svensson (2006) see beside the aspect of 
information asymmetry also the incumbents’ rents out of staying in power as a relevant issue. 
Evidence of PBC was also found in several less developed and new democratic countries. 
Gimpelsen (2001) proved the existence of PBC in Russia, and Asutay (2004) provided evidence 
for the presence of PBC in Turkey. Meanwhile Hallenberg and Souza (2002) prove the existence 
of PBC of EU Accession Countries, in both forms, fiscal and monetary instruments (the later, 
was more common in countries with low level of independence of the Central Banks).  
Recently, there has been growing interest for research on PBC in Albania, also looking into 
phenomena typical for transition economies (Imami and Lami, 2006; Imami and Lami 2008; 
Lami, Imami and Kächelein 2008; Kächelein, Imami and Lami 2008). According to this previous 
research, there is clear evidence of Political Budget Cycles, namely increased public investments 
before elections (Imami and Lami, 2006). One of the sources of financing the state budget in 
transition countries, characterized by a massive privatization process, may be income from 
privatization. That can also be the case if expenditures increase in conjunction with elections. In 
this context, our hypothesis is that the incumbent may engage more intensively in privatizations 
before elections, aiming at increasing public revenues to sustain increased expenditures, in the 
context of Political Budget Cycles. Hence, this paper focuses less on the existence of Political 
Budget Cycles or Political Business Cycles per se, but rather on incumbents potentially use of 
public assets through privatization to finance such election related cycles. 
In the upcoming chapter we will provide a short overview of the privatization process in 
Albania as a background of the hypothesis. Chapter three provides an overview about the method 
and data used while chapter four presents the main findings and chapter five concludes the paper.  
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2. Searching for cycles in income from privatization 
2.1 Background of the hypothesis 
In Albania, the privatization process started in the early 1990’, in the context of the 
transition from planned economy to market economy. Large-scale privatization started in 1992, 
as part of a privatization program guided by the IMF and the World Bank, whose result was that 
the economy was largely in private hands by 1996 (MIGA, 2002) . The privatization process was 
put in halt during the unrest of 1997, but resumed again in the following years. Based on the 
EBRD index, small scale privatization can be seen as finalized since 1995; meanwhile large 
scale privatization persisted on a moderate level until end of the last century (EBRD 2004: p.92, 
2005: p. 96).  
During 2000’, there were privatized the banking sector (currently all secondary level banks 
are in private hands), Albtelecom (the landline monopoly company), OSSH (the Albanian 
electricity distributor), while the government is committed to sell its remaining share in 
Albtelecom and OSSH, and also intends to privatize INSIG a leading insurance company (Prifti 
2010). Again based on the EBRD index, large scale privatization improved mainly in the last 
years as 2008-2010. (EBRD 2009: p.134, 2010: p. 4) 
Privatization processes and agencies are perceived as highly corrupted in Albania (Muço, 
2000). There are indications, that privatization is often used in Albania (but also in other 
transition countries) to finance increased expenditures, also in conjunction to elections. Some of 
the decisions on (partial or full) privatizations of key publicly owned company, as 
telecommunications and energy, were taken months before elections. This phenomenon has 
taken place under different governments, and often such decisions were deemed by the 
opposition, media and economists as related to the elections.1 
In this paper, we test, for the hypothesis, that the incumbent engages more intensively in 
privatizations before elections, aiming at increasing public revenues to finance increased public 
expenditures before elections. Raising revenues as a motivation for privatization is widely 
discussed in the related literature of privatization. Vickers and Yarrow (1991, p.118-19) 
pronounce the motivation of less developed countries to privatize for revenue purposes as they 
                                                           
1 As a tentative background information see for example Alsat (2009), Gazeta Shqiptare (2008), Mitrovicapress 
(2008) and VoA (2005). 
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may be restraint on the bond market due to inflation risks. Nevertheless, this argument focuses 
mainly on the question of market access to bonds. Politicians are also constraint in other ways as 
public perception and restraints placed by other lenders (e.g. IMF).  
3. Method and Data  
3.1 Specifications of Variables, Data and empirical tests 
The time series of income from privatization is monthly, spanning from M1-1999 to M10-
2009 (from January 1999 to October 2009), adding up to 130 observations. There are three 
parliamentary elections taking place in this period, namely June 24, 2001, July 3, 2005 and June 
28, 2009. 
Following the standard approach in this area,2 we will apply the Intervention Analysis based 
on Box and Tiao (1975), a methodology for constructing a statistical model in our study. In this 
paper we test the hypothesis of the existence of changes in the income from privatization before 
elections. Basically the test proceeds by subjecting the monthly seasonally adjusted time series of 
this variable to a Box-Tiao intervention analysis using the most appropriate autoregressive-
moving average (ARIMA) for the social process and an intervention term; here the intervention 
term models the time distance to the election day.  
A simple formal representation of the intervention analysis is:  
0
1
s
t i t i t t t
i
z a z b PDω ε−
=
= + + +∑  
where z  denotes the revenues out of privatization, modelled using a suitable ARMA(p,q) model 
and tPD  a political dummy variable specified later on. The parameter 0ω  measures the change 
caused by the intervention as modelled by the political dummy variable and is estimated along 
with the ARIMA time series component. The estimation procedure provides an estimate of 0ω  
and a confidence interval for the parameter. We have created two kinds of political dummy 
variables to capture the impact of the elections on privatization revenues, namely cumulative 
dummy and discrete dummy.  
                                                           
2 See for example McCallum (1978), Hibbs (1977), Alesina and Sachs (1988), Alesina and Roubini (1992). Hibbs 
(1987) offers a good introduction to the Box-Tiao technique. 
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We have 12 cumulative 8, 7,..., 1,1, 2,..., 4t = − − −  election political dummies ( tPD ) and each 
of them is defined as: 
1
0t
for the t quarters prior to election
PD
otherwise
− −⎧= ⎨ −⎩ , [ 8; 1]t∈ − −  
1
0t
for the t quarters after election
PD
otherwise
−⎧= ⎨ −⎩ , [1;4]t∈  
In the same manner we defined eight discrete elections dummy variables, covering only the 
quarterly and not the cumulative effect of the two years before the election and the same for four 
discrete post election dummy variables. As in case of the first and the last event, the election day 
was at the end of the quarter, the quarter was counted as prior, while in case of the second it is 
take as after election. 
3.2 Estimation of the empirical model 
In the first stage, we have followed precisely the Box-Jenkins (BJ) Methodology (1970). In 
the beginning of the process, the first step was removing the seasonal patterns form the time 
series. Next we carefully investigate on the stationary of the time series as a necessity in further 
steps. The original time series of privatization receipts results stationary based on the 
conventional tests (ACF, PACF correlogram and Augmented Dickey Fuller test). Based on Box-
Tiao’s (1975) intervention analysis, after ensuring for the stationarity, the time-series is modeled 
as ARMA (Auto-Regressive Moving Averages). By modeling through ARMA it is possible to 
prove if elections can explain the changes taking place in household expenditures, in addition to 
the past history of the variable and the random error term. Hence, it is necessary the 
identification of ARMA (p,q) benchmark model. To find the “best” ARMA model for each time 
series we are straightforwardly based on Box-Jenkins methodology (1970). Hence, in order to 
model the analyzed time series as an ARMA we went thought an iterative process of 
identification, estimation and diagnostic checking of several ARMA models until we found the 
most plausible one, deemed as the “best” for each series3. The most appropriate model 
tentatively found was the one with just only one moving average term with a lag four.  
                                                           
3 Gujarati (2003) makes a simple and clear explanation of the Box – Jenkins Methodology. 
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In the second stage we individually incorporated each of the political dummy variables in the 
ARMA model tentatively found in the first stage and re-estimated the whole model now with an 
additional incorporated tPD  aiming at capturing the possible impact of elections on retail sales 
and test whether elections has any impact on the econometric time-series utilized by this study in 
addition to variable’s past value and its respective error term. Thus, the impact of elections is 
considered to be an intervention or shock in the determination of the value of the analyzed 
variable by forcing the value of the variable to shift during the intervention or shock periods. The 
statistical significance of the political dummy variables is tested using t-test. Consequently, if the 
coefficient of the political dummy variable is statistically significant and has the expected 
positive sign we can conclude that income from privatization increase before elections. 
4. Results and Discussions 
Following the Box Jenkins methodology, the original series of the privatization receipts 
behaves almost as a white noise with ACF and PACF correlograms indicating for serial 
autocorrelations only at seasonal lags of 16. After testing and comparing several models the one 
with just a monthly seasonal term MA(16) seems to be the most appropriate model. The residuals 
of this model behave randomly and the model manifests an acceptable fit. The estimated 
equations of privatization are presented below: 
PRIREC = 683.5 + 0.544*MA(16) 
PRIRECAVIND = 107.1 + 0.544*MA(16) 
In addition to the original dependant variable, privatization receipts in millions of Lek4 
(PRIREC), we define another one. In order to interpret our results in relative terms and to have a 
better measurement of the amplitude of the changes in the variable of interest before the 
elections, we apply also a monthly index for the privatization receipts with the monthly average 
serving as a base (PRIRECAVEIND). The same econometrical techniques and analysis are used 
for both the variables of interest and the same ARIMA model fits best in both cases.  
                                                           
4 100 ALL (Albanian Lek) equals approximately 1 US$.  
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Table 1. Empirical Results: Cumulative Dummy Variables 
tPD  Privatization receipts 
(absolute) 
PRIREC   
Privatization receipts 
(relative) 
PRIRECAVEIND  
-8 791.015 *** 124.000 *** 
-7 700.781 *** 109.855 *** 
-6 820.235 *** 128.581 *** 
-5 1027.702 *** 161.104 *** 
-4 1214.730 *** 190.423 *** 
-3 1144.846 *** 179.468 *** 
-2 1158.374 *** 181.587 *** 
-1 1609.617 *** 252.327 *** 
 1 119.889  18.792  
 2 -384.630  -60.294  
 3 -430.096  -67.421  
 4 -573.419 * -89.889 * 
 * implies that the result is significant at a 10%, ** at a 5 % level and *** at 1 % percent level.  
Table 1 summarizes the main findings concerning the cumulative dummy variables. Prior to 
elections, the estimated coefficients of all cumulative political dummy variables are of positive 
sign and significant at least at 5 percent level. This implies for a “manipulative” behavior of the 
incumbent to have higher privatizations receipts before the election day. The estimated 
coefficient for all the cumulative dummy variables, ( 1PD− , 2PD− , …, 8PD− ) show a statistically 
significant average increase from 700 to 1,600 million Lek per each month before the elections 
(PRIREC), or speaking in relative terms, an average increase from 10% to 2.5 times more 
(PRIRECAVEIND) than the global time series average. The coefficient is higher for 1PD−  and 
follows a decreasing trend toward the level of the eighth dummy variable ( 8PD− ) implying for a 
stronger “manipulative” behavior of the incumbent as the elections come closer.  
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Table 2. Empirical Results: Discrete Dummy Variables 
tPD d Privatization receipts 
(absolute) 
PRIREC 
Privatization receipts 
(relative) 
PRIRECAVEIND 
-8 375.765  58.902  
-7 -573.717  -89.941  
-6 -718.089  -112.569  
-5 150.348  23.569  
-4 1135.981 ** 178.076 ** 
-3 949.114 * 148.785 * 
-2 610.479  95.698  
-1 1609.617 *** 252.327 *** 
 1 119.889  18.7927  
 2 -944.026  -147.984  
 3 -489.259  -76.697  
 4 -940.798  -147.479  
 * implies that the result is significant at a 10%, ** at a 5 % level and *** at 1 % percent level.  
We try to test more directly the intensification of this behavior by using the discrete dummy 
variables iPD d  (Table 2). As a matter of fact, it results that the privatizations receipts are 
significantly higher during one year before the elections, ranging from 1 to 2.5 times more than 
the mean of the whole time span and not significant for the period of more than one year before 
the elections. That drives to the implication that the incumbent does its best to have much more 
receipts from privatization during the last year to elections which is fully consistent with the 
opportunist theory of Nordhaus (1975). There is evidence of an intensifying pattern within the 
last year to election as 1PD d−  is evidently higher than 3PD d−  and 4PD d− , although the value 
does not increase monotonically for all the iPD d
5.    
The econometrical results show that the huge increase in the privatizations receipts during 
one year prior to election is immediately vanished after the elections (table 1 and 2), 
strengthening the argument for  an opportunistic behavior of the incumbent. Almost all of the 
coefficients of the dummy variables capturing the time after the election day are not statistically 
significant. The coefficient of 4PD , which captures one year after the elections, is significant at 
10% level and has a negative sign for both of the variables used, strengthening the argument. 
                                                           
5
3PD d− is lower than 4PD d−  and 2PD d−  is not statistically significant in the conventional levels. 
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The missing of a clear pattern after the election may also result out of the impossibility of 
perfect timing in revenues out of privatization. Although the government may try to increase the 
revenues before the elections, payments may be done with a certain unexpected delay, implying 
a less clear path after the elections. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
Transition countries are characterized by massive privatizations during the first decade(s) of 
the transition. Privatization, in addition of enabling the improvement of efficiency of different 
formerly publicly owned economic units, may serve as a source of income for the economy. 
Thus, it may be assumed that when income is needed by the incumbent, to finance certain public 
expenditures, than there is a stronger incentive to engage in privatization. Typical case when 
public investments and other types of public expenditures increase is elections. As predicted by 
PBC theory, incumbent may engage in fiscal expansion before elections, to increase likelihood 
of reelections, which has been found true for Albania in our previous research. We find 
statistically significant increase of income from privatization before elections, which leads us to 
conclude that one of the reasons is to finance increased expenditures before elections. Other 
reasons, such as corruption, may be behind such behavior, but is difficult or impossible to 
measure and control for the “true” motivations. These results are of particular interest, as it is for 
the first time that income from privatization is analyzed in conjunction with PBC, and therefore 
its implications and interest in the context of the PBC related research agenda goes beyond the 
case of Albania.  
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